“第二次俄乌战争”——政策报告——RAS_NSA

![](/media/202412//1733466273.3191354.png)我们可以从中吸取什么教训呢 “第二个俄罗斯-乌克兰

战争

![](/media/202412//1733466273.3369315.png)**亨宁米克利斯，波齐洛**

政策报告

2023年7月12日

阅读时间： 15 min

本战略说明审查了可以从中吸取的初步教训

乌克兰战争。它主要是基于所组织的两个研讨会

本主题由战略分析网络及其合作伙伴撰写 2023年2月和3月。与一些专家的预测相反

尽管其部分领土仍被占领，但乌克兰已经设法做到了这一点 抵抗，甚至重新夺回几个领土——即使这是可以的

部分原因要归因于西方国家对其他国家的支持和援助

比如日本——因为俄罗斯最后一次重大的领土收获可以追溯到日本 到2022年的冬天。而这些专家也强调了明显的一点

基辅和莫斯科在经济上的不对称， 人口统计，军事力量，似乎不对称 注定乌克兰的地位，俄罗斯的地位

维克多，在过去的16个月里已经证明了有限的相关性 这样的肤浅的解释。此外，越南和阿富汗

更不用说21世纪的阿富汗战争了， 经常暴露出这种分析的空虚性。

此外，这一课可以追溯到几个世纪前，并且已经有了 在公元前5世纪的希腊-波斯战争中证明。

压倒性的数字优势，甚至是在一个独裁主义者之间

一个政权和一个民主的政权，也就是说，在一个可以 由于几乎没有检查，迅速调动资源

平衡和辩论，以及另一个问题，其中包括这两个因素

构成了这个系统的本质，这绝不是保证 胜利。

**亮点**

在过去的16个月里，我们揭示了许多重要的事情

俄罗斯犯下的战略和战术错误。这些来源于 其意识形态在计划其战争努力中的盛行。

与此同时，乌克兰已经迅速适应了对其国家的侵略

领土由于其道德优势，两者之间的合作 平民和军队，以及其军事软件[1]的力量。

![](/media/202412//1733466273.348276.jpeg)虽然从一开始就很少有人关注它

入侵，海洋领域的重要性不应该是

对…估计不足乌克兰在这方面的结构性弱点，

由于2014年战争等因素，影响很大 ![](/media/202412//1733466273.3564365.jpeg) 促进了俄罗斯在入侵前的准备工作

基辅的经济疲软，因为乌克兰严重依赖海上业务 贸易

目前的僵局和战争的长期性质 ![](/media/202412//1733466273.3651016.png) 作战前线可以主要归因于缺乏

确立了双方的空中优势。这证明了

空中领域的重要性和对北约盟国的需要

迅速而集中地对其空中能力进行再投资，以确保 在北侧具有清晰和威慑力的空中优势

同盟这样的投资对无人机和所有航空公司也都是必要的 武器系统和探测能力是必要的

反访问/区域拒绝策略。

**********

**介绍**

一年多前，俄罗斯无理地发起了第二次俄罗斯-俄罗斯 乌克兰战争的[2]，正如我们已经见证了一个新的开始 在乌克兰最近几周的进攻中，本文强调了具体情况

可以从冲突中吸取的教训，特别是在军队中

领域本注释中提出的论点主要基于两个方面

由战略分析网络组织的研讨会和它的研讨会

合作伙伴在2023年2月和3月，解决这两个方面 冲突

第一次研讨会包括两次圆桌讨论和一次圆桌讨论

会议（由迈克尔 ·科夫曼主持）集中在战略上

关于俄罗斯军事效力的经验教训 乌克兰第一次圆桌会议旨在通过

分析乌克兰、俄罗斯以及北约的表现

各种领域(演讲者包括伊丽莎 ·乔格，弗兰斯 ·奥辛加， 汉娜谢莱斯特和亚历山大拉诺斯卡)。第二个圆桌会议 促进了几位专家之间关于战后问题的交流

观点(与杰克波特，玛丽亚波波娃，奥克萨娜谢维尔，和贾斯汀

马西第二次研讨会于2023年3月16日举行，涉及了广泛的 十位专家[3]之间的讨论，重点是冲突的解决

2023年的情景，以及战略弱点和优势 两个交战国。

一些军事和战略上的观察可以做出超过一个

就在冲突开始的一年后。这些观察结果超出了 战场和战术水平。主导的或有时有限的，

但偶尔也会发生变化，在某些军事领域(海上、 空中，网络)揭示了这场冲突提供了教训的程度

未来的高强度战争。此外，这场战争还证明了如何这样做 这两个交战国的军事软件，以及韧性

乌克兰社会，是影响其进程的关键变量。它 强调了数字上的劣势和不对称性

火力并不一定会决定一场冲突的结果

很多方面。

**俄罗斯人背后的原因** **僵局和乌克兰**

**意想不到的事**

在第一次会议之后，很明显，一种有偏见的行为

人们对乌克兰的看法影响了俄罗斯的战略。俄罗斯的自我 宣布在其地区环境和附属庸中发挥领导作用

它认为属于乌克兰的地位影响了这场战争的计划。 这些措施阻止了克里姆林宫准确评估乌克兰问题 阻力能力。虽然很难得出明确的结论

关于俄罗斯在战场上的僵局的结论，似乎是这样的

这种意识形态优先于对他们的战争的有效规划 努力

根据研讨会第二次圆桌会议上的小组成员 2月24日，俄罗斯方面低估了其准备工作

乌克兰军队将在2014年至2022年期间进行新的入侵 吞并克里米亚和顿巴斯群岛)。除了军队之外

国防著作已经发展，乌克兰采用的概念

国家的抵抗和弹性在2021年就已经开始了 加强其信息安全工作。这些措施准备

社会为攻击的可能性，并最终增强了 乌克兰制度和社会的弹性。通过低估

乌克兰及其人民，莫斯科错误地相信自己可以征服基辅 两周。在入侵后的15个月里，很明显

俄罗斯制定了在其军事范围之外的帝国主义野心 能力尽管进攻的规模和战前的改革

在俄罗斯军队中，莫斯科未能突破乌克兰军队

前线其军事努力的战略规划并不明确 由于部队缺乏准备，进攻十分艰难

在地面上不确定。结构性赤字造成的减少

在他们的武装部队内的战术小组和空中力量的缺乏

优势[4]阻止了莫斯科摧毁乌克兰的战略力量 重心。

专家们在2月24日召开了第一次圆桌会议

还强调了来自乌克兰人的意外因素

抵抗与俄罗斯军队不同，乌克兰军队举行了示威游行

其力量之间的真正协调以及灵活性，允许它

迅速适应俄罗斯的侵略。有两个基本原因可以

这也解释了乌克兰抵抗运动的韧性。而乌克兰人

人们当然不会想到会有这么大规模的进攻，他们确实有了

逐渐适应了被吞并后的一种不安全的气氛

2014年在克里米亚和部分顿巴斯地区，随后是低强度的

2014年期间发生的战争和俄罗斯的不稳定行动 和2022年。如前所述，这种对风险的适应是

体现为采用民族抵抗和

2021年的弹性。

因为乌克兰人一直是侵略的明显受害者，一些人 专家解释说，这种立场让他们坚定不移

动机和弹性。事实上，由俄罗斯发起的战争是第一

被煽动的方式：从这个意义上说，基辅比莫斯科拥有道德优势。 它使他们能够动员他们的大多数人

他们所忍受并所获得的无端侵略

来自他们大多数盟友的明确支持。相比之下， 围绕2008年格鲁吉亚战争的叙述也强调了

格鲁吉亚政府在引发冲突中负有一定的责任，

因为他们在南奥塞梯开始了军事行动(尽管它可以 他认为这是他们的领土，而不是俄罗斯人

地区

关于俄乌战争，重要的是要注意到这一点

冲突对于乌克兰及其人民的生存是必要的

事实上已经使其军事软件更加强大。乌克兰人 军事和政治当局已从这些贡献中受益

平民从战争开始的努力。迈克尔科夫曼

强调了平民会毫不犹豫地保卫他们的城市的事实

在等待乌克兰军队有组织的部署期间

入侵的开始。这样的战争努力允许乌克兰人参战

军事软件要迅速加强和发展。它继续

受益于平民的贡献，特别是在情报方面

在战场上，展示了武装部队之间的真正合作 以及在整个战争背景下的乌克兰人口。

对于一些专家来说，这种配置对

缺乏组织和积极性的俄罗斯军队。此外，账户

从俄罗斯战俘那里可以看出，许多俄罗斯士兵都是这样的 不知道他们的目的地/目标，甚至不知道几天或几个小时

在入侵之前。至少，他们只有一些误导性的简报 承诺他们会受到乌克兰人作为解放者的欢迎。

据亚历山大 ·拉诺兹卡说，这是一个重要的战略教训

想想看：这场战争凸显了军事软件的重要性， 这和军事硬件一样重要，甚至更重要。

然而，正如专家们在最后一次圆桌会议上所证明的那样 第一次研讨会，俄罗斯的战术和战略错误，以及缺乏

在乌克兰方面的能力和设备，已经导致了一个

战争的僵局。冲突的第二阶段说明了这一点，

因为克里姆林宫决定通过战争来弥补军队的不足 反复的轰炸，通过瞄准目标来削弱乌克兰的抵抗

他们的后部位置。这种损耗策略，之前在

这给乌克兰人带来了巨大的人力损失，但是 不允许俄罗斯获得重大领土。

根据迈克尔 ·科夫曼的说法，俄罗斯的战略和战术错误 最终导致了其军队内部的信心危机。尽管

信息很难获取，有人怀疑会有阻力

以及俄罗斯军事机构内部的逃兵运动。这个

最近瓦格纳的领导人突袭失败，理由是内部的背叛 俄罗斯军事最高指挥官和要求的辞职

总参谋长瓦莱里 ·格拉西莫夫和国防部长，

谢尔盖 ·绍伊古，公开展示了失去信任的程度和 对俄罗斯军队内部的不信任(也包括正规军

如私人军队，如叶夫根尼 ·普里戈津或拉姆赞 ·卡德罗夫的私人军队)。

这些力量似乎士气低落

乌克兰社会准备保卫自己，以抵御侵略者的生存。 奥克萨纳 ·Shevel指出，经过一年的对抗，近90% 的乌克兰人宣布他们愿意继续下去

尽管普京经常发出核打击的威胁，但他仍在战斗。 截至6月12日，这一数字几乎保持不变，为84%。

事实上，俄罗斯拥有不可否认的人口优势

在第二次研讨会上讨论。然而，乌克兰显然和 在士气方面明显占优势。就像有些人一样

在3月16日的圆桌会议上，俄罗斯的优势之一是它的

与乌克兰相比。在一场消耗战中，莫斯科已经做到了 这个优势是由于它可以调动的部队数量。然而

双方在动机方面的差异是很明显的。为了

各种原因，乌克兰，包括它的精英和人口，显然

这表明了它愿意继续战斗的意愿。尽管有这种道德

优势在于，但仍然很难确定乌克兰人是否 动机将足以彻底击退俄罗斯军队

鉴于莫斯科的人口优势和对其的漠视

正如叶卡捷琳娜 ·皮斯努诺娃指出的，自己的损失。

**战争的进行和战争的进行**

**某些的各自重要性**

**军事领域(海上、空中、** **和网络）**

正如汉娜 ·谢莱斯特所强调的那样，尽管俄乌战争 主要是一场地面战争，海上领域还远非一场

在冲突中具有次要战略重要性。海上的 领土在俄罗斯的进攻准备中的重要性

2022年2月尤其值得注意。由于重大损失 2014年海上军事能力被兼并

克里米亚，乌克兰无法确保全面的保护和保护 对其海岸的有效威胁评估。的装运

乌克兰的盟友在2019年才开始使用乌克兰的海上设备 为时已晚，也不允许乌克兰克服其防御和安全问题

其沿海地区的赤字。因为乌克兰的经济不景气

依赖于海上贸易（其70%的出口产品来自海运）， 这种能力赤字已经产生了重大后果。俄罗斯人

能够利用这一战略弱点和经济优势吗

依赖：2022年2月进攻前一个月，乌克兰 港口被俄国人封锁了。此事件突出显示 研究入侵前的准备阶段的重要性，

这暴露了乌克兰方面的弱点。为汉娜避难所， 乌克兰在海上领域的缺陷和供应的延迟

因此，军事装备应促使专家界使用 考虑加强乌克兰在这方面的能力。

然而，海上领域在冲突中的重要性 准备阶段不应掩盖该公司的优势

领空根据弗兰斯 ·奥辛格的说法，空中领域已经被证明了

对这场战争的权力平衡具有决定性作用。它解释了正在进行的 由于缺乏既定的空中优势而造成的僵局

两旁正如迈克尔 ·科夫曼所强调的，莫斯科的原因 起初没有瞄准乌克兰的基础设施

这次攻势仍有些不清楚。看来，对a

迅速接管乌克兰及其首都并没有促使俄罗斯采取行动 最高指挥部要考虑建立空中优势

已经削弱了乌克兰的防空能力。此外，缺乏 在空中领域的进攻能力(压制敌人的空中

防御系统/摧毁敌人的防空系统，SEAD/DEAD)，以及a

缺乏经验丰富的飞行员，这可以解释俄罗斯人缺席的原因

在空中领域的主导地位，从而导致了僵局 战场上的两个交战国。

在这方面，弗兰斯 ·奥辛加倾向于认为，除了少数例外，

空中领域对乌克兰战略形势的影响 尽管它具有决定性的潜力

结束冲突，并有可能解决危机。根据

作为专家之一，这一观察应该作为一个战略教训， 特别是对支持乌克兰的北约盟友来说。根据Frans 因此，这个领域的战略重要性证明了这一点

大多数盟友需要迅速和集中地对其空中投资进行再投资 几十年来忽视他们的能力。北约的空中优势

它的北侧必须尽快恢复，以阻止任何人进入

从俄乌冲突或任何进一步的俄罗斯冲突中产生的溢出效应 不稳定的尝试。

空中领域的重要性也意味着北约成员国

是否应该显著发展他们的无人机能力，而不管他们的能力吗 大小或功能。这场战争确实显示出了重要的作用

由无人机扮演，尽管他们自己不是决定性的 情报、交通、战斗或自杀功能。它是平等的

要建立一个必要的防御体系，就像现在的俄罗斯一样

经常使用无人机。这样的发展使得发展 并实施反访问/区域拒绝策略，依靠

各种武器和探测系统，甚至更有必要。

正如亚历山大 ·拉诺斯卡所指出的，网络的重要性一直不那么重要 在冲突。这一观察结果应该会导致一种微妙的变化

理解现代新技术的重要性

战争尽管出现了颠覆性的技术及其技术

对全球稳定的影响，他们在这场战争中的次要作用有助于 相对它们的战略重要性。当然要一些教训

从将这些新技术融入乌克兰社会中学到的东西

例如，通信和控制系统。然而，他们只是 作为军事战略的“经典 ”领域的缓和作用。 据这次圆桌会议的专家说，网络领域不能 更换它们。

然而，网络工具允许发展进攻和

与这些传统领域相关的防御系统。网络的有限作用

最终证实了这场战争的传统性质，与

现代战争，在高度局部化和

划定的正面。正如一些专家提到的，俄-乌克兰 战争已被证明是一场具有全能特征的消耗战

依靠核威慑，重型火炮，和

思想在某种程度上，它与20世纪的模式相呼应

冲突

**结论**

但不幸的是，这场战争很有可能会继续下去 在今年之后，对冲突的分析使我们能够做到 确定可能对西方国家有用的具体经验教训

他们的盟友(包括在世界其他地区，如南方 中国海在这方面，俄罗斯帝国主义意识形态 已经促使俄罗斯精英和政府制定了政治政策 超过他们军事能力的野心。由于这种失明， 俄罗斯战争中缺乏组织和计划

把“特别行动 ”变成了一场拖延不懈的战争 损耗成为现实。除了有害的影响之外

俄罗斯帝国主义的意识形态，值得注意的是 许多专家对乌克兰国家的抵抗。这突出了

一个社会的重要性和一个国家的军事心态 这和现有的武器系统一样重要。

从战术的角度来看，一些经验教训也可以从 争执而海事领域在准备工作和

在战争的初期，空中领域的重要性逐渐扩大

冲突演变。虽然海洋和海洋的重要性 空中领域应该强调，也要注意

与预测和讨论相反，网络上的作用更为有限

关于未来的冲突。因此，我们能否假设这将是一个问题

在未来的战争中？例如，法国新的军事计划 法律表明，在法国武装部队和精锐圈子中

分析倾向于认为网络是未来的一个重要因素 冲突，因此增加了这一领域的资金。

然而，必须考虑到这些初步的经验教训和观察结果 它们是什么：初步的分析。战争还远未结束

专家们在第二次研讨会中提到，鉴于俄罗斯人

战争背后的动机，未来几个月的和平前景 不太可能。此外，现在就希望

俄罗斯内部的动荡，包括瓦格纳的叛变，反对 俄罗斯军事最高指挥权，将积极影响建立

无论是一个消极的和平，还是一个积极的和平。俄国人内部的分歧

政治-军事机构肯定会对战场产生影响 可能有利于乌克兰人。但回到教训

从这场冲突中得出的结论，如空中领域所示

在冲突期间，特定部门的重要性可能会有所不同，意愿也会有所不同 去抵制和动员社会。因此，这些初始

分析/教训应该被考虑在内，但不应该被考虑 被认为是这场战争的决定性教训。

[1]术语“军事软件 ”是指所有的机制和机制

所实施的计划和发起进攻或防御的计划 在战时对抗对手。

[2]术语“第二次俄乌战争 ”是用来突出的 由乌克兰非法和无端入侵乌克兰造成的破裂

2022年2月俄罗斯。而在乌克兰东部的战争并没有真正发生

自2014年以来就停止了，尽管2015年的明斯克协议，2022年2月 代表着俄乌冲突的一个转折点。

[3]的演讲者是：多米尼克 ·阿雷尔，洛朗 ·博尔齐罗，扬 ·布鲁特， 玛格达莱娜 ·德宾斯卡，德尔芬-杜塔德，海蒂 ·哈特，贾斯汀

马西，福尔克 ·奥斯特曼，叶卡捷琳娜 ·皮斯库诺娃和奥利维尔 ·施密特。

[4]的空军优势被西方的军事战略家认为是一种优势 所有域外犯罪的先决条件。

政策报告23 -可以从俄乌两国那里吸取什么教训 战争

![](/media/202412//1733466289.3492022.png)

What lessons can be drawn from the “Second Russo-Ukrainian

![](/media/202412//1733466289.3950949.png)war”?

[**Satcha de Henning Michaëlis**](https://ras-nsa.ca/expert/satcha-de-henning-michaelis/), [**Laurent Borzillo**](https://ras-nsa.ca/expert/laurent-borzillo/)Policy Reports

July 12, 2023

Time to Read: 15 min

This strategic note examines the initial lessons that can be drawn from the war in Ukraine. It is primarily based on two seminars organized on this topic by the Network for Strategic Analysis and its partners in

![](/media/202412//1733466289.447193.png)February and March 2023. Contrary to what [some](https://twitter.com/dszeligowski/status/1614293389780090880?lang=fr) [experts](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3261607-the-war-is-not-yet-over-but-ukraine-has-already-lost/) predicted, and although part of its territory is still occupied, Ukraine has managed to resist and even recapture several territories – even though this can be partly attributable to [Western support](https://ras-nsa.ca/infographie-sur-le-soutien-militaire-du-canada-a-lurkraine/) and assistance from other states [such as](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/02/17/les-cartes-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine-depuis-l-invasion-russe-de-fevrier-2022_6118209_3213.html) [Japan](https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/02/23/quels-sont-les-pays-qui-ont-le-plus-aide-l-ukraine-financierement-depuis-le-debut-de-la-guerre_6126677_4355775.html) [– as the last significant Russian territorial gains date back to the winter of 2022. While these](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/02/17/les-cartes-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine-depuis-l-invasion-russe-de-fevrier-2022_6118209_3213.html) [same](https://twitter.com/dszeligowski/status/1614293389780090880?lang=fr)[experts](https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3261607-the-war-is-not-yet-over-but-ukraine-has-already-lost/) [emphasized the glaring](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/02/17/les-cartes-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine-depuis-l-invasion-russe-de-fevrier-2022_6118209_3213.html) asymmetry between Kyiv and Moscow in terms of economics,

demographics, and military power, an asymmetry that seemingly

destined Ukraine to the status of the defeated and Russia to that of the victor, the past 16 months have demonstrated the limited relevance of such superficial interpretations. Moreover, the Vietnam and Afghan

wars in the last century, not to mention the [21st](https://ras-nsa.ca/panel-1-the-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/)-century Afghan war, have regularly exposed the emptiness of this kind of analysis.

Furthermore, this lesson dates back several centuries and had already been demonstrated by the [Greco-Persian Wars](https://www.tallandier.com/livre/les-guerres-mediques/) in the 5th century BCE. Overwhelming numerical superiority, even between an authoritarian regime and a democratic one – that is, between a system that can

quickly mobilize its resources due to the near absence of checks and

balances and debates and another one where these two elements

constitute the very essence of the system – will by no means guarantee a victory.

**Highlights**

![](/media/202412//1733466289.4597032.jpeg) The past sixteen months have revealed numerous significant strategic and tactical mistakes by Russia. These stem from the prevalence of its ideology in planning its war effort.

![](/media/202412//1733466289.497889.jpeg) In parallel, Ukraine has quickly adapted to the aggression on its

territory due to its moral advantage, the collaboration between

civilians and the army, and the strength of its military software[[1]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftn1).

![](/media/202412//1733466289.5435805.jpeg) Although it has been given little attention since the beginning of the invasion, the importance of the maritime domain should not be underestimated. The structural weaknesses of Ukraine in this area, resulting from the 2014 war and other factors, have greatly

facilitated Russia’s preparation before the invasion and have

economically weakened Kyiv, as Ukraine heavily relies on maritime trade.

![](/media/202412//1733466289.5535097.jpeg) The current stalemate and the prolonged nature of the war on the operational front can be primarily attributed to the absence of

established air superiority from either side. This demonstrates the importance of the aerial domain and the need for NATO allies to reinvest rapidly and intensively in their air capabilities to ensure clear and deterrent air superiority on the northern flank of the

Alliance. Such an investment is also necessary for [drones](https://ras-nsa.ca/the-proliferation-of-militarized-civilian-drones-in-ukraine-a-lesson-from-the-war-for-western-military-staffs/) and all weapon systems and detection capabilities that are essential for [anti-access / area denial strategies](https://lerubicon.org/publication/dans-le-deni-sur-le-deni-pourquoi-le-succes-aerien-de-lukraine-doit-inquieter-loccident/).

**********

**Introduction**

Over a year after Russia unjustifiably initiated the second Russo-

![](/media/202412//1733466289.5644038.png)[Ukrainian war](https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1984478/volodymyr-zelensky-kiev-moscou-contre-attaque)[[2]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftn2)[, and as we have witnessed the beginning of a new](https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1984478/volodymyr-zelensky-kiev-moscou-contre-attaque)

[Ukrainian offensive in recent weeks, this paper highlights specific](https://ici.radio-canada.ca/nouvelle/1984478/volodymyr-zelensky-kiev-moscou-contre-attaque)

lessons that can be drawn from the conflict, particularly in the military realm. The arguments presented in this note are primarily based on two seminars organized by the Network for Strategic Analysis and its

partners in February and March 2023, addressing these two aspects of the conflict.

The first seminar consisted of two roundtable discussions and a

[conference](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/) (featuring Michael Kofman) focusing on the strategic

lessons that could be drawn regarding Russian military effectiveness in Ukraine. The first roundtable aimed to draw military lessons by

analyzing the performances of Ukraine, Russia, and, indirectly NATO, in various domains (the speakers included Eliza Gheorghe, Frans Osinga, Hanna Shelest, and Alexander Lanoszka). The second roundtable

facilitated an exchange between several experts on post-war

perspectives (with Jack Porter, Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel, and Justin Massie). The [second seminar](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/), held on March 16, 2023,involved a broad discussion between ten experts[[3]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftn3), focusing on conflict resolution

scenarios for 2023, as well as the strategic weaknesses and strengths of both belligerents.

Several military and strategic observations can be made more than a

year after the conflict started. These observations extend beyond the

battlefield and the tactical level. The dominant or sometimes limited, yet occasionally variable, roles of certain military domains (maritime, aerial, cyber) reveal the extent to which this conflict provides lessons for future high-intensity wars. Furthermore, this war demonstrateshow the military software of both belligerents, as well as the resilience of

Ukrainian society, are crucial variables that shape its course. It

highlights that numerical inferiority and asymmetry with regard to firepower do not necessarily determine the outcome of a conflict in many respects.

**The reasons behind the Russian stalemate and the Ukrainian**

**surprise**

Following the [first conference](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/), it became evident that a biased

perception of Ukraine influenced the Russian strategy. Russia’s self- proclaimed leadership role in its regional environment and the vassal status it attributed to Ukraine influenced the planning of this war.

Those prevented the Kremlin from accurately assessing Ukrainian resistance capabilities. While it is difficult to draw definitive

![](/media/202412//1733466289.5788846.png)conclusions about the Russian stalemate on the battlefield, it seems [that ideology took precedence over the effective planning of their war effort.](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/)

According to the panellists in [the second roundtable](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) of the seminar on February 24, the Russian side underestimated the preparedness of

Ukrainian forces for a new invasion between 2014 and 2022 (following the annexation of Crimea and Donbas). In addition to the military

defence writings it had developed, Ukraine adopted the concept of

national resistance and resilience in 2021 and had already begun

strengthening its information security. These measures prepared

society for the possibility of an attack and ultimately enhanced the

resilience of the Ukrainian system and society. By underestimating

Ukraine and its people, Moscow falsely believed it could conquer Kyiv in two weeks. Over fifteen months after the invasion, it is evident that

![](/media/202412//1733466289.5897481.png)[Russia formulated imperialistic ambitions beyond its military](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/)

capabilities. Despite the scale of the offensive and the pre-war reforms in the Russian military, [Moscow](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2023/02/17/les-cartes-de-la-guerre-en-ukraine-depuis-l-invasion-russe-de-fevrier-2022_6118209_3213.html) failed to breakthrough the Ukrainian frontlines. The ambiguous strategic planning of its military effort and the lack of preparedness of its troops made the offensive arduous and inconclusive on the ground. Structural deficits caused by a reduction in [tactical groups](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/) within their armed forces and the absence of air

superiority[[4]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftn4) prevented Moscow from destroying Ukraine’s strategic centers of gravity.

The experts in the [conference](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/) and the [first roundtable on February 24](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)

also emphasized the surprise factor stemming from the Ukrainian

resistance. Unlike the Russian forces, the Ukrainian army demonstrated true coordination between its forces as well as flexibility, allowing it to quickly adapt to the Russian aggression. Two fundamental reasons can explain the resilience of Ukrainian resistance. While the Ukrainian

![](/media/202412//1733466289.6006567.png)people certainly did not expect an offensive of this magnitude, they had gradually adapted to an atmosphere of insecurity after the annexation of Crimea and part of the Donbas in 2014, followed by a low-intensity war and Russian destabilization operations that occurred between 2014

and 2022. As mentioned earlier, this acclimatization to risk was manifested by adopting the concept of national resistance and resilience in 2021.

Because Ukrainians have been the clear victims of the aggression, some experts explain that this position allows them to display unwavering

motivation and resilience. Indeed, the war initiated by Russia was in no way provoked: in this sense, Kyiv holds a moral advantage over Moscow.

It enables them to mobilize the majority of their population in the face of the unprovoked aggression they have endured and to obtain

[unequivocal support from most of their allies](https://fr.statista.com/infographie/28241/pays-fournissant-le-plus-d-aide-militaire-a-ukraine/). By comparison,

narratives surrounding the [2008 war in Georgia](https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ei/1900-v1-n1-ei3591/038932ar.pdf) also highlighted the

Georgian government’s share of responsibility in triggering the conflict, as they initiated military operations in South Ossetia (although it can

be legitimately argued that it was their territory and not a Russian region).

![](/media/202412//1733466289.6142375.png)[Regarding the Russo-Ukrainian war, it is crucial to note that this](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)

[conflict is existential for the survival of Ukraine and its people, which](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) has *de facto* made its military software more robust. The Ukrainian

military and political authorities have benefited from the contribution of civilians to the war effort from the outset of the war. Michael Kofman [highlighted](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/) the fact that civilians did not hesitate to defend their cities while awaiting the organized deployment of Ukrainian troops at the

beginning of the invasion. Such a war effort allowed the Ukrainian military software to strengthen and develop rapidly. It continued to

benefit from the contribution of civilians, especially in the [intelligence](https://desk-russie.eu/2022/12/01/y-a-ennemi.html) field, demonstrating genuine cooperation between the armed forces

and the Ukrainian population in a total war context.

For some experts, this configuration made a difference against

disorganized and less [motivated](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/04/russian-soldiers-ukraine-anger-duped-into-war) Russian troops. Moreover, accounts

from Russian prisoners of war indicate that many Russian soldiers were unaware of their destinations/objectives, even a few days or hours

before the invasion. At a minimum, they only had misleading [briefings](https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-soldiers-drafted-ukraine-told-wouldnt-face-combat-nyt-2022-12#:~:text=In%20September%2C%20The%20New%20York,they%20were%20going%20to%20war.) promising them to be welcomed as liberators by the Ukrainians.

According to [Alexander Lanoszka](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), this is a significant strategic lesson to consider: this war highlights the importance of military software, which is just as essential, if not more, than military hardware.

However, as the experts demonstrated in the final roundtable of the

![](/media/202412//1733466289.626673.png)first seminar, Russian tactical and strategic mistakes, as well as the lack [of capabilities and equipment on the Ukrainian side, have led to a](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-2/)

[stalemate in the war. The second phase of the conflict illustrates this,](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-2/) as the Kremlin decided to compensate for its lack of troops through repeated bombardments to weaken Ukrainian resistance by targeting their rear positions. This strategy of attrition, previously observed in Syria, has resulted in a significant human cost for Ukrainians but has not allowed Russia to make significant territorial gains.

According to Michael Kofman, the Russian strategic and tactical errors have ultimately led to a crisis of confidence within its army. Although information is difficult to access, there are [suspicions](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/) of a resistance

and desertion movement within the Russian military apparatus. The

[recent failed raid](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2023/06/24/rebellion-en-russie-en-direct-les-troupes-de-wagner-quittent-rostov-evgueni-prigojine-va-partir-en-bielorussie-selon-le-kremlin_6179023_3210.html) by the leader of Wagner, citing betrayals within the

Russian military high command and demanding the resignations of the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov and the Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu, publicly demonstrated the level of loss of trust and

mistrust within the Russian forces (including the regular army as well as private armies such as [Yevgeny Prigozhin](https://lerubicon.org/publication/ce-que-larmee-de-frederic-le-grand-peut-nous-apprendre-de-la-societe-militaire-russe-wagner/)’s or [Ramzan Kadyrov](https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/europe/manifestations-en-ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-les-combattants-tchetchenes-affirment-etre-prets-a-tenir-le-front-de-bakhmout_5862953.html)’s).

These forces appear to be demoralized in the face of a committed

Ukrainian society ready to defend itself against the aggressor to survive.

[Oxana Shevel](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-2/) points out that after a year of confrontation, nearly 90% of the Ukrainian population declared their willingness to continue

fighting despite the regular threats of nuclear strikes issued by Putin. As of June 12, this figure remains almost unchanged, standing at [84%](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/beyond-the-counteroffensive-84-of-ukrainians-are-ready-for-a-long-war/).

Indeed, Russia holds an undeniable demographic advantage, as

discussed in the [second seminar](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/). However, Ukraine clearly and

significantly holds the advantage in terms of morale. As some have

argued during the [March 16 roundtable](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/), one of Russia’s strengths is its demographics compared to Ukraine. In a war of attrition, Moscow has the advantage due to the number of troops it can mobilize. However, the disparity in terms of motivation between the two sides is clear. For various reasons, Ukraine, including its elites and population, clearly

demonstrates its willingness to continue the fight. Despite this moral advantage, it remains difficult to determine whether the Ukrainian

motivations will be enough to definitively repel the Russian armed

![](/media/202412//1733466289.653351.png)[forces given Moscow’s demographic advantage and its disregard for its own losses, as Ekaterina Piskunova points out.](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/)

**The conduct of the war and the**

**respective importance of certain**

**military domains (maritime, aerial, and cyber)**

As emphasized by [Hanna Shelest](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), although the Russo-Ukrainian war

has primarily been a ground war, the maritime domain is far from a

theatre of secondary strategic importance in the conflict. The maritime domain’s significance in Russia’s preparation for the offensive in

February 2022 is particularly noteworthy. Due to significant losses in maritime military capabilities in 2014 following the annexation of

![](/media/202412//1733466289.695249.png)[Crimea,Ukraine could not ensure comprehensive protection and](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)

[efficient threat assessment on its maritime coast. The shipment of](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)

maritime equipment by Ukraine’s allies that started only in 2019 was too late and did not allow Ukraine to overcome its defence and security deficit on its maritime coast. As Ukraine is heavily economically

dependent on maritime trade ([70% of its exports come from the sea](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)),

this capacity deficit has had significant consequences. The Russians

were able to capitalize on this strategic weakness and economic

dependence: one month before the February 2022 offensive, Ukrainian

ports were blocked by the Russians. This event [highlights](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) the

importance of studying the preparation phase preceding the invasion, which reveals weaknesses on the Ukrainian side. For [Hanna Shelest](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), Ukraine’s deficiencies in the maritime domain and the delayed supply of military equipment should therefore prompt the expert community to consider strengthening Ukrainian capabilities in this area.

However, the importance of the maritime domain in the conflict’s

preparation phase should not overshadow the predominance of the

aerial domain. According to [Frans Osinga](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), the aerial domain has proven decisive for the balance of power in this war. It explains the ongoing

stalemate resulting from the absence of established air superiority from either side. As highlighted by [Michael Kofman](https://ras-nsa.ca/axis-i-the-war-in-ukraine-lessons-learned-and-the-future-political-settlement/), the reasons why Moscow refrained from targeting Ukrainian infrastructures at the beginning of the offensive remain somewhat unclear. It appears that the belief in a swift takeover of Ukraine and its capital city did not prompt the Russian high command to consider establishing aerial dominance that would

have weakened Ukraine’s air defence capabilities. Furthermore, the lack of offensive capabilities in the aerial domain (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses, SEAD/DEAD), as well as a shortage of experienced pilots, would explain the absence of Russian

dominance in the aerial domain and thus the stalemate between the two belligerents on the battlefield.

In this regard, [Frans Osinga](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) tends to believe that, with a [few](https://lerubicon.org/publication/guerre-aerienne-en-ukraine-le-probleme-de-diagoras/) [exceptions](https://lerubicon.org/publication/dans-le-deni-sur-le-deni-pourquoi-le-succes-aerien-de-lukraine-doit-inquieter-loccident/), the impact of the aerial domain on the strategic situation in Ukraine

has not been sufficiently studied, despite its decisive potential for

![](/media/202412//1733466289.708881.png)ending the conflict and potentially resolving the crisis. According to [one of the experts](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), this observation should serve as a strategic lesson, especially for NATO allies supporting Ukraine. According to Frans

Osinga, the strategic importance of this domain demonstrates that most allies need to rapidly and intensively reinvest in their aerial

capabilities after decades of neglecting them. NATO’s air superiority on its northern flank must be restored as quickly as possible to deter any spillover from the Russo-Ukrainian conflict or any further Russian

destabilization attempts.

The importance of the aerial domain also means that NATO members should significantly develop their drone capabilities, regardless of their size or function. The war has indeed demonstrated the significant role played by drones, [although they are not decisive on their own](https://ras-nsa.ca/the-proliferation-of-militarized-civilian-drones-in-ukraine-a-lesson-from-the-war-for-western-military-staffs/), for

[intelligence, transportation, combat, or suicide functions](https://ras-nsa.ca/fr/video-drones/). It is equally necessary to build a defence system against them, as Russia now

[regularly](https://www.ledevoir.com/monde/791870/l-ukraine-dit-avoir-contre-l-attaque-de-drones-la-plus-importante-sur-kiev) employs drones. Such development makes the development and implementation of [anti-access / area denial strategies](https://lerubicon.org/publication/dans-le-deni-sur-le-deni-pourquoi-le-succes-aerien-de-lukraine-doit-inquieter-loccident/), relying on various weapon and detection systems, even more necessary.

As [Alexander Lanoszka](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) points out, cyber has been of lesser importance

in the conflict. This observation should lead to a nuanced

understanding of the importance of new technologies in modern

warfare. Despite the emergence of disruptive technologies and their impact on global stability, their secondary role in this war helps to

![](/media/202412//1733466289.719497.png)relativize their strategic importance. There are certainly lessons to be [learned from integrating these new technologies into the Ukrainian communication and control system, for example. However, they only](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/) serve as a palliative to the “classic” domains of military strategy.

According to the experts in this roundtable, the cyber domain cannot replace them.

However, cyber tools allow for the development of offensives and

defences related to these traditional domains. The limited role of cyber ultimately confirms the [traditional nature of this war](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/), in contrast to

modern warfare that mobilizes hybrid strategies on highly localized and delineated fronts. As mentioned by some experts, the Russo-Ukrainian war has proved to be a war of attrition with the characteristics of an all- out war that has relied on nuclear deterrence, heavy artillery, and

ideology. In a certain way, [it echoes the modalities of 20th](https://ras-nsa.ca/roundtable-1/)-century conflicts.

**Conclusion**

![](/media/202412//1733466289.7916906.png)While it is, unfortunately, more than likely that this war will continue beyond the current year, the analysis of the conflict allows us to

identify specific lessons that can be useful for Western countries and their allies (including in other regions of the world, such as the South China Sea). It is evident in this regard that Russian imperialist ideology has driven Russian elites and the government to formulate political

ambitions that exceed their military capabilities. Due to this blindness, the lack of organization and planning in the Russian war effort quickly turned the “special operation” into a protracted war, where stagnation and attrition became realities. Alongside the detrimental influence of Russian imperialist ideology, it is worth noting the surprise that the

Ukrainian national resistance posed for many experts. This highlights the importance of a society’s and a state’s military mindset, which is just as crucial as the available weapon systems.

From a tactical perspective, several lessons can also be drawn from the conflict. While the maritime domain was crucial in the preparation and initial phase of the war, the significance of the aerial domain grew as

the conflict evolved. Although the importance of the maritime and

aerial domains should be emphasized, it is also important to note the

more limited role of cyber, contrary to predictions and discussions

about future conflicts. Can we, therefore, assume that this will be the

case in future wars? For example, the new French military programming law indicates that within the French armed forces and elite circles, the analysis tends to consider cyber as a significant element of future

conflicts, hence the increase in funding in this area.

However, these initial lessons and observations must be regarded for

what they are: preliminary analyses. The war is far from over, and as the

experts mentioned in the second seminar, given the Russian

motivations behind the war, prospects for peace in the coming months are highly unlikely. Furthermore, it is still too early to hope that the

internal turmoil in Russia, including the mutiny of Wagner against the Russian military high command, will positively impact establishing

either a [negative](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-to-expect-from-the-war-in-ukraine/) or [positive](https://espace-mondial-atlas.sciencespo.fr/fr/rubrique-(in)securites/article-4A08-paix-positives-et-durables.html) peace. The divisions within the Russian

political-military apparatus will certainly have battlefield effects that could favour the Ukrainians. But returning to the lessons that can be

drawn from this conflict, as illustrated by the aerial domain, the

importance of specific sectors can vary during a conflict, as can the will to resist and the mobilization of society. Therefore, these initial

analyses/lessons should betaken into account, but they should not be regarded as definitive lessons from this war.

[[1]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftnref1) The term “military software” refers to all the mechanisms and programs implemented to plan and launch an offensive or defense against an adversary in wartime.

[[2]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftnref2) The term “second Russo-Ukrainian war” is used to highlight the

rupture caused by the illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by

Russia in February 2022. While the war in eastern Ukraine has not truly ceased since 2014 despite the Minsk agreements of 2015, February 2022 represents a turning point in Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

[[3]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftnref3) The speakers were : Dominique Arel, Laurent Borzillo, Yann Breault, Magdalena Dembinska, Delphine Deschaux-Dutard, Heidi Hardt, Justin Massie, Falk Ostermann, Ekaterina Piskunova and Olivier Schmitt.

[[4]](https://ras-nsa.ca/what-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-the-second-russo-ukrainian-war/#_ftnref4) [Air superiority](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/strategieaeriennecomparee.pdf) is considered by military strategists in the West as a prerequisite for all extraterritorial offensives.

![](/media/202412//1733466289.846459.png)[Policy Report 23 - What lessons can be drawn from Russo-Ukrainian](https://ras-nsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Policy-Report-23-What-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-Russo-Ukrainian-war.pdf)

[war](https://ras-nsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Policy-Report-23-What-lessons-can-be-drawn-from-Russo-Ukrainian-war.pdf)